Liberty,
Gender, and
the Family by McKitrick, Jennifer
University of Nebraska - Lincoln
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy Philosophy, Department of
2006
Liberty, Gender, and the Family
Jennifer McKitrick
University of Nebraska-Lincoln, jmckitrick2@unl.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy, Department of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of
Nebraska - Lincoln.
McKitrick, Jennifer, "Liberty, Gender, and the Family" (2006). Faculty Publications - Department of Philosophy. 30.
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/philosfacpub/30
3 
Liberty, 
Gender, and 
the Family 
Jennifer McKitrick 
DISCUSSIONS OF JUSTICE within the classical liberal, libertarian 
tradition have been universalist. They have aspired to apply to 
any human community, whatever the makeup of its member-
ship. 
Certainly some feminists have taken issue with this, arguing 
that the classical liberal, libertarian understanding of justice 
fails to address the concerns of women, indeed, does women 
an injustice. Among these we find Susan Moller Okin, and it 
will be my task in this essay to explore whether Okin's criticism 
is well founded. 
Susan Moller Okin's justice, Gender, and the Family is a land-
mark feminist discussion of distributive justice that raises issues 
no political philosophy should ignore.) However, libertarians 
have tended to ignore it. That is perhaps not surprising as Okin 
1. Susan Moller Okin, Justice, Gnukr, and tlu Family (New York: Basic 
Books. 1989). 
Published in LIBERTY AND JUSTICE, ed. Tibor Machan (Stanford: Hoover Institution 
Press, 2006), pp. 83-103. Copyright 2006 Hoover Institution Press.
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would have us believe that libertarian feminism is incoherent. 
Some libertarians seem to agree, leading one to believe that 
liberty is incompatible with justice for women. Perhaps liber-
tarians and feminists agree on the "facts," but disagree on the 
values. Whereas the feminist is willing to sacrifice liberty for 
justice, the libertarian is willing to sacrifice justice for liberty. 
Although the libertarian might object to this characterization 
on the grounds that the demands of justice would be met by 
a libertarian scheme, the feminist can equally object that the 
"liberty" she is willing to sacrifice means liberty for men and 
domestic servitude for women. Okin finds libertarianism prob-
lematic for two reasons: its philosophical foundations and its 
unjust consequences for women. (She focuses, as will I, on 
women in quasi-democratic industrial societies.) I will argue, 
contra Okin, that neither the philosophical foundations nor the 
possible implications of libertarianism are as problematic for 
feminism as she claims. 
J. OWNERSHIP 
One of the philosophical foundations that Okin attacks is lib-
ertarian theories of property. Justification of a right to property 
and of a Lockean labor theory of property acquisition is part 
of the classical liberal tradition, taken up by Nozick in Anarchy, 
State, and UtOPia. 2 Okin's most explicit attack on libertarianism 
in Justice, Gender, and the Family is a reductio ad absurdum of 
Nozick's views about property. Okin argues that absurd con-
sequences follow from the Lockean labor-mixing theory of 
property acquisition and the observation that mothers produce 
offspring via labor.3 The reductio ad absurdum may be sum-
marized as follows: 
2. Robert Nozick. Anarchy. Statf. and Utopia (New York: Basic Books. 
1974). 
3. Okin, 79-85. 
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1. You come to own something by mixing your labor with it. 
2. Women mix their labor with genetic materials and nutri-
ents, and thereby produce offspring. 
3. Therefore, mothers own their offspring. 
Add to that the view that you retain ownership until you vol-
untarily transfer it, and it turns out that we are our mother's 
slaves. 
How might the libertarian reply? As an initial observation, 
this problem has little to do with the labor theory of property 
acquisition, which is a theory about how a person may come 
to own something that was previously unowned. A pregnant 
woman "mixes her labor" with things that are inside her own 
body. If we grant, as Okin seems to, some degree of self-own-
ership, it would be highly atypical for something inside of a 
woman's body not to be owned by anybody. Arguably, a 
woman owns her uterus, the food she eats, and the male ge-
netic material that is freely "donated." An effortless transfor-
mation of these materials into a child would raise the same 
issues. So targeting the labor theory of property acquisition is 
off the mark, despite the linguistic connection to the "labor" 
of childbirth. What is really at issue is the view that owning 
the parts or raw materials entails a right to own whatever those 
parts become. However, that is not an explicit tenet of the 
LockeaniNozickian view of ownership (though it is plausible 
that they would accept it, or something like it). 
Also note that Okin is assuming a particular theory of di-
achronic identity that may be rejected.4 An adult human being 
is composed of entirely different physical matter than the fetus 
his or her mother carried. Even if the mother owned the mat-
4. For more on personal identity. see Derek Parfit, Reasons aruJ Pmons 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1984);John Perry. Pmonalldmlity (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press. 1975). pt. 3. 
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ter that became the fetus. it is not clear that she ever owned 
anything numerically identical to any subsequent adult. Or. if 
you believe a human being has an essential nonphysical part 
that accounts for diachronic identity. the fact that the mother 
contributed physical matter would be insufficient to establish 
ownenhip. Along these lines. a popular poet advises mothen 
that ·[children] come through you but not from you."s How-
ever. if you believe that human beings are made of matter and 
that they sustain the same identity from the womb to adult-
hood and that you hold unrestricted rights of ownenhip. in-
cluding rights to own people and to dispose of owned property 
at will. then you are vulnerable to this problem Okin raises. 
and you may in the end justify a matriarchal slave state. 
However. libertarians need not be committed to such 
views. including those about ownenhip. One could accept a 
Lockean view of how one comes to own unowned nonsentient 
property. yet not extend that to owning humans. One could 
consistently hold that there are certain kinds of beings that 
cannot legitimately be owned. Rational agents seem a likely 
candidate. Along these lines. one might hold that if a human 
being mixed his labor with silicon and electronic elements and 
built an artificial intelligence that rose to the level of a rational 
agent. that claims of ownenhip would become problematic. 
The same reasoning would justify denying women ownenhip 
of their adult offspring. 
This still leaves potentially problematic implications for 
newborn. prerational infants. Adding the above restriction 
leaves open the possibility that mothen own their newborn 
infants and may modify. sell, or dispose of them, as any other 
piece of property, prior to the point at which they become 
5. Kahlil Gibnn. -Cblldren.- in TIu PropAel (New York: Alfred A Knopf. 
1973). 
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rational agents. However, even if mothers did, in some sense, 
own their very young children (and the cluster of parental 
rights seems not entirely unlike ownership), issues of owner-
ship do not answer all moral questions. Most people believe 
that it is possible for humans to own animals and that torturing 
your puppy for fun is wrong. Some libertarians have more 
complex, nuanced theories of ownership than Okin gives them 
credit for. Ubertarians are not committed to the view that the 
right to own property entails that people can acquire complete 
dominion over absolutely anything that can be retained 
through any possible transfonnation. Nozick himself points out 
a number of problems with that absolutist approach, notes the 
complexities involved, and leaves many questions unan-
swered.6 So, Lockean theories of property necessarily have the 
consequences Okin envisions. 
II. CONTRACTARIAN FOUNDATIONS 
A second philosophical foundation of libertarianism that Okin 
attacks is contractarianism. Broadly speaking, a contractarian 
approach attempts to justify social nonns by reference to con-
tracts or mutual agreements. Players on the political scene are 
perceived as independent adults who make rational political 
decisions based upon self-interest. Individuals have no com-
mitments or obligations to others but for the ones that they 
choose to take on. 
As Okin points out, if the parties to the contract are all 
independent adults acting on rational self-interest, the relevant 
population apparently includes neither mothers nor children. 
And if it doesn't, then either it is not self-sustaining or it dawns 
on caregivers like a natural resource. In reality, one or more 
6. Nozick. 174-182. 
people are required to take each political actor from birth to 
this relatively self-sufficient state. If we tacitly assume that pe0-
ple exist who bear and raise children, then the success of our 
theory depends on the fact that traditional women's work gets 
done. And furthermore, the theory depends on this caregiving 
work being accomplished in a way that yields independent in-
dividuals without commitments or obligations. Okin charges 
that contractarians take it for granted that before, during, and 
after these mutually advantageous agreements are made, there 
are women around being caregivers. 
By assuming, without mentioning, that there is someone 
available whose responsibility it is to raise children, political 
philosophers leave the necessity of caregiving outside consid-
eration, outside the realm of justice. Ironically, although the 
whole theory is set up to justify people's obligations by what 
they overtly, implicitly, or hypothetically agreed to, it is ex-
pected that domestic obligations will be filled, without even 
pondering the question of whether any rational, self-interested 
individual did or would agree to take on the responsibility of 
raising children. If the self-sufficient, independent political ac-
tor is not a reality, then we need to clarify what role said actor 
is playing in political theory. Or if these real-world facts about 
human life are not relevant, then it is not clear that a political 
philosophy for "mushroom men" is relevant for real-world hu-
mans.7 
A libertarian may respond by offering a modified contrac-
tarianism, which begins by asking, • Are all of the traditional 
assumptions about political actors really necessary?" What if 
we assume that players come to the table with histories, ties, 
7. Mushroom men spring from the ground with self-interested ration-
ality; Mark A Lutz and Kenneth Lux. ·Commenting on Gendered Econom-
ics: Mushroom Men. Straw Men, and Real Persona.· in ReoietIJ of SocW £am-
om'} 53:1 (Spring 1995). 121-131. 
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interdependencies, and a debt of gratitude to their parents? 
What if, instead of taking it for granted that women's work will 
get done, we acknowledge that child care and other domestic 
work are among the issues that are on the table for determin-
ing mutually advantageous arrangements? It is not clear that 
these assumptions would doom a contractarian project. The 
agreements people would make under these conditions would 
be worth considering. 
Okin herself otTers a modified Rawlsian contractarianism. 
According to Rawlsian contractarianism, just political arrange-
ments are those that would be chosen by individuals who were 
ignorant about their particular assets (social status, wealth, tal-
ents, etc.). That way, no one would be able to skew social ar-
rangements to their particular advantage. Okin would include, 
where Rawls originally does not, that the hypothetical negoti-
ators would be ignorant about their own genders.1I That way, 
gendered division of labor would not be accepted unless the 
negotiators would be truly willing to fill any of the gender roles 
available. Rawls theorizes that his negotiators would agree to 
the two principles of justice: 
1. "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive 
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others"; 
2. "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so 
that they are: 
a. to the greatest benefit to the least advantaged; 
h. attached to offices and positions open to all under con-
ditions of fair and equal opportunity. "9 
Okin essentially agrees with these principles of justice, but she 
8. Okin. 101-109. 
9. John Rawls. A Theory of Justice (Cambridge. MA: Harvard University 
Press. 1971).60. 
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takes issue with Rawls regarding their interpretation and im-
plementation. But like Rawls, Okin sees their implications as 
more liberal than libertarian. 
However, Rawls says his principle of liberty trumps the 
difference principle when there is a conflict, and a thorough-
going reading of the principle of liberty might generate some 
fairly libertarian conclusions. In his post-Theory of Justice work, 
Rawls waters down the principle of liberty, in part to avoid just 
this sort of result, but it is not clear that he is justified in doing 
SO.IO Moreover, even if we let the difference principle go un-
trumped, it is not clear that the result must be contrary to 
libertarianism or economic efficiency. Rawls himself states, "It 
should be noted that the difference principle is compatible with 
the principle of efficiency." I I If libertarian economic theory is 
correct-a factual question independent of ethical considera-
tions-then a libertarian society would in fact be more likely 
than any other system to work out to the advantage of the least 
well off. 
Another possible response to Okin is to offer a noncon-
tractarian foundation for libertarianism, such as a utilitarian, 
Aristotelian foundation. However, as any reader of Okin is 
aware, she has objections to virtually every political philosoph-
ical tradition, so there is no easy escape from her feminist cri-
tique. 
III. CONSEQUENTIALIST ARGUMENTS 
Okin's greatest challenge to libertarianism is not directed 
against libertarianism per se yet it entails that libertarianism is 
unacceptable because of the consequences it would have for 
10. John Rawls. Po/W:al Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press. 
1993). 
11. Rawls. 7'Iuory of Justice. 70. 
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women and children.12 According to Okin. our current extent 
of free association and contract and our current social practices 
leave women vulnerable to an extent that is incompatible with 
justice. So, according to Okin, restrictions of liberty are needed 
to achieve justice. If she is right, then a society based on lib-
ertarian principles would surely have unjust consequences. In-
dividual men and women making voluntary rational choices in 
the situations in which they find themselves results in women 
being unfairly disadvantaged. 
Okin describes a cycle of inequality and vulnerability, 
which might be better characterized as a downward spiral for 
the individual woman. I will characterize this cycle in terms of 
a simple fictional story about a couple, Sue and Bob. They are 
a young couple of equal education. As often happens, Bob, 
being male. finds a job making somewhat more money than 
Sue. Sue's employer does not want to invest too much in Sue 
because chances are she will start a family and devote less en-
ergy to work or even quit. Meanwhile, Bob has a chance to 
transfer for a promotion. Sue does not get a transfer and would 
end up on the ground floor of a new company. However, the 
net household income would increase as a result of the move, 
so the move makes sense for the couple. 
Then Bob and Sue decide to have children. Who should 
care for the children? If that question is even considered, it 
becomes clear that diverting Bob's energies from his career 
would severely diminish the family's resources, so it does not 
make sense for him to be the primary caregiver. Domestic help 
and day care would cost almost as much as Sue's salary. So 
even if they are not consciously thinking that mothers are bet-
ter parents, given their social context and the fact that they 
both want children, it makes sense for Sue to take time off of 
work to devote to motherhood. 
12. Okin, 134-169. 
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As a stay-at-home mother, Sue loses touch with her profes-
sional contacts and with developments in her field, whereas 
Bob gets another promotion. Mer the children get a little 
older, Sue tries to get her career back on track. She puts the 
children in day care several hours a week and works part time 
as an assistant to the person who holds her old job. Sue has 
little opportunity for advancement. She tries to increase her 
hours, but when her child is sick, she has to leave work. She 
cannot stay late because the day care closes at 5 P.M. She is not 
getting ahead as she had hoped, and the housework is piling 
up. Sue asks Bob for help with the children and around the 
house. He does not refuse, but mentions his professional re-
sponsibilities and little changes. Tensions rise in their relation-
ship. Of course, if she does not like the arrangement, she can 
leave. She contemplates the personal and financial hardships 
that such an action would involve and decides that pursuing 
her career is just not worth it. Besides, now Bob is making 
enough to support the whole family. 
Then one day, Bob comes home and announces he is leav-
ing Sue (for someone who is more fun and less demanding). 
Sue goes back to work full time, out of necessity. She and her 
children move into an apartment, and now she has to pay for 
full-time day care out of her meager salary and nominal child 
support. Bob, on the other hand, has a convenient visitation 
arrangement and more spending money. 
The moral of the story is that the reasonable choices Bob 
and Sue made together amounted to investing in Bob's per-
sonal capital, improving his exit options, and increasing his 
power in the relationship. Meanwhile, Sue invested in her fam-
ily and has little to show for it. Although everyone's story is 
different, the pattern is all too common. Women are caught in 
a cycle of inequality at work and at home. The expectation that 
women will bear greater domestic responsibilities leads to in-
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equalities in the work place, which leads to women bearing 
greater domestic responsibilities, which exacerbate inequalities 
in the work place, and so on. 
Okin locates the major obstacles to women's equality in the 
gendered division of labor in the home and in the related struc-
ture of the workplace, which leaves no time to meet substantial 
domestic responsibilities. Full-time careers were designed for 
people with wives at home. This makes freedom from child-
care responsibilities a practical prerequisite for professional 
success. Consequently, people in positions of power tend to be 
people who are not particularly sensitive to the needs of chil-
dren and caregivers. 
I think Okin has identified a legitimate social problem that 
arises from people making seemingly autonomous choices. 
Okin asks: "How can we address this injustice? This is a com-
plex question. It is particularly so because we place great value 
on our freedom to live different kinds of lives, [and] there is 
no current consensus on many aspects of gender .... "1lI She 
acknowledges that there is something of value at stake. But 
apparently, it is a value worth sacrificing: "The way we divide 
the labor and responsibilities in our personal lives seems to be 
one of those things that people should be free to work out for 
themselves, but hecause of its vast repercussions it helongs cl«zrly 
within the scope of things that must he governed by principles of jus-
tiel' (emphasis added).l4 Furthermore, Okin seems to think 
that being governed by principles of justice means being gov-
erned by the state. 
The fact that Okin thinks that justice requires state restric-
tions on liberty becomes clear when we look at some of her 
specific policy recommendations for dealing with the cycle of 
IS. Okin, 171. 
14. Ibid. 
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inequality. According to Okin, employers should be "required 
to" ("mandated," "must"): provide mothers pregnancy and 
childbirth leave; provide mothers and fathers parental leave 
during the post-birth months; allow workers with children ages 
seven and under to work flexible part-time hours with full ben-
efits; allow parents of children with health problems or disa-
bilities to work flexible hours; provide high-quality on site day 
care for children from infancy to school age; and restructure 
any demands that conflict with parenthood during child-bear-
ing years. The last is particularly important in academic and 
legal careers, where the most pressing career challenges tradi-
tionally occur when a person is between ages twenty-five and 
thirty-five. If an employer does not make these provisions, di-
rect government subsidies should be given to lower-income 
parents with children in day care. And schools should be re-
quired to provide high-quality after-school programs. IS Perhaps 
Okin's most original suggestion is the following: If a couple 
chooses a traditional division of labor within their marriage, 
both partners should have equal legal entitlement to all earn-
ings-employers must issue two paychecks equally divided be-
tween the employee and his partner. Hi 
IV. LIBERTARIAN RF.SPONSF.S 
Onsite day care and flexible hours would be great for working 
parents, and officially splitting the paycheck of the wage earn-
ing partner might be an excellent arrangement for some cou-
ples. However, mandating or requiring these practices would 
interfere with self-determination of the terms of our own as-
sociations, agreements, and contracts. Okin's recommenda-
tions would place substantial burdens on taxpayers. businesses, 
15. Ibid .. litHii. 
ifi. Ibid .. 1 K 1. 
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and employers and would probably have various unwanted 
consequences. For example. new detection and enforcement 
mechanisms would be required to oversee marital financial ar-
rangements. So perhaps Okin's recommendations are too in-
terventionist, restrictive, or impractical-the cure is worse than 
the disease. 
But even if that is so, Okin's diagnosis still stands, and at 
this point, it seems to me that libertarians have basically two 
ways to respond. One is to grant that under the present gender 
system, people making free choices about work and family re-
sults in a situation in which women are "differently advan-
taged" and that it would require substantial interference with 
personal liberty to alter this situation. But, the libertarian ar-
gues, such interferences are unacceptable. So, unfortunately for 
women, that is just the way it is. And unfortunately, many lib-
ertarians seem to have this response. They hail the traditional 
gendered division of labor as marvelously efficient or "natural" 
or acquiesce to it as inevitable or beyond question, and they 
seem oblivious or insensitive to the vulnerabilities it creates. A 
classic example of this is John Stuart Mill, whose On Liberty 
places him within the classical liberal tradition. 17 In The Sub-
jection of Women, Mill spends one hundred pages brilliantly ar-
guing that we have no reason to believe that women and men 
have different natural abilities, nor that gender inequalities are 
justifiable.18 Furthermore, he is aware that earning power can 
translate into dominance. Mill says, "There will naturally also 
be a more potential voice on the side, whichever it is, that 
brings the means of sUpport."19 However, as forward-looking 
17. John Stuart Mill, On LiJJn1y (New York: Penguin Books, 1975). 
18. John Stuart Mill. TIu Subjection of Women (New York: Prometheus 
Books. 1986). 
19. Mill, Subjection, 46. 
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as his views on women were, he could not envision any alter-
native to the traditional gendered division of labor. Mill says: 
When the support of the family depends ... on the earnings. 
the common arrangement. by which the man earns the in-
come and the wife superintends the domestic expenditures. 
seems to me in general the most suitable division of labor 
between the two persons.2O 
Shortly after, he says more strongly, "It is not ... a desirable 
custom that the wife should contribute by her labor to the 
income of the family ... " because the children would not be 
properly cared for.21 For Mill, getting married and having chil-
dren is a career choice for a woman. Mill says: 
Like a man when he chooses a profession, so, when a woman 
marries. it may in general be understood that she makes a 
choice of the management of a household. and the bringing 
up of a family. as the first call upon her exertions. during as 
many years of her life as may be required for the purpose; 
and that she renounces ... all which are not consistent with 
the requirements of this.22 
But getting married and having children is not a career choice 
for a man. The husband has a wage-eaming career and a family. 
Mill inexplicably adopts a double standard here. which he so 
eloquently rejects in every other context. 
One might say that despite being ahead of his time in many 
ways, Mill was a product of his day. But contemporary liber-
tarians seem to have the same mental block. Once, at a Liberty 
Fund conference, a participant asked, "Why do married 
women work?" I retorted, "Why do you ask why married 
women work?" He replied, "Because I just assumed that single 
20. Ibid., 53. 
21. Ibid. 
22. Ibid., 54. 
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women would have to work." I was dumbfounded, trying to 
process this nonsequitur. Then I realized he had assumed the 
relevant contrast class of married women was single women, 
and he could not conceive of anyone asking "why do married 
men work?" even when prompted. The moment passed, and 
it seemed that no one in the room grasped the import of my 
question. 
If libertarianism is unconcerned about the traditional gen-
dered division of labor and all of the vulnerability for women 
that it entails, then it should be shunned by feminists. Some 
libertarians might say "good riddance," but the point is that 
they are apparently content with a system that does not pro-
vide equal opportunities for women, which seems to be in ten-
sion with the Libertarian Party platform: 
As Libertarians, we seek a world of liberty; a world in which 
all individuals are sovereign over their own lives, and no one 
is forced to sacrifice his or her values for the benefit of oth-
ers.23 
A patriarchal world is not one in which women are sovereign 
over their own lives. And although overt physical force is not 
always used, the gender system promotes and depends on the 
expectation that women will sacrifice their values for the ben-
efit of others. 
So, the first line of response is woefully inadequate, for it 
is hardly a response at all. It amounts to basically being obliv-
ious or turning a blind eye to the issues Okin raises. If that is 
the best that libertarians can do, they are proper subjects of 
feminist criticism. A better libertarian approach would be to 
acknowledge the Okin has identified some serious difficulties, 
but that state intervention is neither the only nor the best way 
23. National Platform of the Ubertarian Party, http://www.lp.orglissuesl 
platform_aU.shtml. 
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to deal with them. In order to do this, however, libertarians 
have to offer other strategies for dealing with the cycle of in-
equality. The problem, for rhetorical purposes anyway, is that 
there is not, nor can there be, a grand libertarian plan for co-
ordinating and changing behavior, of employers and individ-
uals, both in their private and professional lives. Perhaps edu-
cational, consciousness-raising programs could be initiated, 
alerting women to the risks of vulnerability by marriage. How-
ever, a great deal of the impetus for change needs to come 
from the individual and at the grassroots level. 
Again, the difficulties Okin brings to our attention are very 
real, and it does not diminish their significance at all to suggest 
that different people can have different and creative ways of 
dealing with them in their own lives. Okin seems to have 
greater confidence in the ability of government to manage 
women's lives than in the ability of women to protect their own 
interests. Perhaps historically women have been unable to ef-
fectively protect their interests, but the failure of governments 
to protect the interests of women is much worse. To offer al-
ternatives, libertarians can brainstorm about possible strategies 
that individuals may employ, not because women cannot think 
for themselves, but to show that there are ways to combat the 
cycle of inequality without restricting liberty. These are prac-
tical, even mundane suggestions, but Okin presents what is 
essentially a practical problem-how can a woman be a parent 
without becoming economically dependent and vulnerable? 
Different particular solutions are suitable for different in-
dividual circumstances, opportunities and aspirations. Some 
people can work out mutually advantageous arrangements 
with employers, individually or collectively. Some employers 
find, for reasons other than coercion, that it is in their interest 
to enable their employees to meet other commitments. In 
some careers, women can freelance or work at home. Careers 
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in education are particularly suitable for someone who wants 
to raise children, since the hours can accommodate caring for 
school-age children. Nursing is another profession with flexible 
hours, and pays well with good benefits, even for part-time 
employment. 
Another possible strategy is to invest in one's own educa-
tion while one's children are young. Colleges and universities 
offer courses at various hours, and it is usually possible to co-
ordinate with daycare or elementary school schedules. A par-
ent can go less than full time depending on her other com-
mitments, and she can study and write at home at opportune 
moments. (I speak from experience: I began my higher edu-
cation when my son was three, and he attended my public 
Ph.D. defense when he was fifteen.) 
However, we need to stop thinking of balancing work and 
family as just a women's issue and start thinking of it as a 
parent's issue. That means getting rid of the assumption that 
the woman's responsibility is domestic and the man's respon-
sibility is financial. That is not to say that in the best possible 
world, all parents have careers. 
Being free of the necessity to earn income is often a desir-
able circumstance for anyone, especially for a parent of a 
young child. But it is important that parents work out an ar-
rangement to minimize vulnerability for the non-wage-earning 
parent. 
V. MARRIAGE CONTRACTS 
Okin laments the current state of family law, which puts 
women and children at a disdvantage.24 An alternative would 
be to allow people to work out their own arrangements. For-
2 .... Okin,163. 
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mally dividing the wage-eamer's paycheck is one such possible 
arrangement, but other types of marriage contracts may be 
mutually advantageous for different people. However, Okin is 
suspicious of independent marriage contracts. One might ob-
ject to marriage contracts on the grounds that they make what 
should be a romantic union into a business transaction. How-
ever, that is not Okin's worry. She bas no qualms about bring-
ing considerations of justice into the private sphere and worries 
that appeals to emotion and unconditional giving are tools that 
consign women to their traditional gender roles. Instead, 
Okin's worry about the idea that couples can make their own 
marriage contracts is that they take insufficient account of the 
history of gender in our culture, our own psychologies. the 
present inequalities between the sexes, and the well-being of 
any children involved at any point.25 The agreement reached 
by the parents may put subsequent children at risk, children 
who had no opportunity to give their consent. She notes that 
justice is not always enhanced by freedom of contract if the 
individuals involved are in unequal positions to start with. 
With regard to the point about children. the fact is that 
children are always born into circumstances they did not ask 
for. Some of these circumstances are fortunate. and some are 
not. There may be various ways extra-parental forces might 
want to protect children from circumstances beyond their con-
trol. but forbidding parents from forming the kind of relation-
ships they want to have hardly seems the most effective strat-
egy or the most pressing concern when it comes to protecting 
children against the contingencies of life. Ensuring more sub-
stantial child support in the event of divorce pales in compar-
ison to ending physical abuse and sexual molestation perpe-
trated against children. 
25. Ibid. 173. 
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But a more important question is, why does Okin think 
that women are at a disadvantage with respect to bargaining 
in a marriage contract? Okin's reasons seem to be that women 
have less earning power and that women are expected to, and 
have been conditioned to, accept contracts on unequal terms. 
However, expectations change and consciousness rises. Al-
though the wage gap does need to be closed, its current exis-
tence need not prevent women from making advantageous ar-
rangements. It should also be pointed out that even women in 
relatively traditional marriages often manage the household 
money and make major financial decisions. Power dynamics in 
relationships are not always determined simply by relative 
earning power. 
Okin notes that men are better off financially after a di-
vorce.26 Although she is wise to draw our attention to the fi-
nancial power dynamics within families, if money were all that 
mattered, then men would have no reason to stay married. Yet 
many of them do. Many men apparently get something out of 
marriage that is more important than a higher standard of liv-
ing for themselves. Studies have shown that married people 
are healthier.'17 Most men and women want to have children 
and benefit from a parental partnership. Most men want part-
ners and families and are willing to sacrifice other things they 
value in order to have a stable family life. 
So if men have at least as much to gain through marriage 
as women do, why would women be at a disadvantage with 
respect to bargaining for terms of a marriage contract? Is it 
because men will not get married unless it is on their terms? 
Or because if left on their own, women will continue to enter 
26. Ibid., 161. 
'no Linda Waite and Maggie Gallagher. 1M CastJor MflfTiIIgt: WlayMGr-
riMJ P.ple Art Happilr. Hea/II&ier. and Beller Off FifumdaJIy (New York: Dou-
bleday. 20(0). 
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into disadvantageous arrangements, oblivious to their own bar-
gaining power? Although that is possible, it is not necessarily 
true. To have an unequal bargaining position, it is not enough 
that you start off with less. It also must be the case that you 
value making the bargain more than the other party does. For 
example, an employer may start off with more resources than 
a potential employee. However, if the employer wants to hire 
the applicant more than the applicant wants to work there, the 
employer has more to lose by not making the bargain. The 
applicant can hold out for a higher salary than the employer 
initially offered. 
In the case of devising an individual marriage contract, why 
should women value "making the bargain" of marriage more 
than men do? Given Okin's picture of what traditional mar-
riage has to offer women and men respectively, she should 
expect it to be the opposite. Unless women want to get married 
more than men do, it is not clear why women should settle for 
arrangements that increase their vulnerability. When most ca-
reers were closed to women, they really were in an unequal 
bargaining position. Marriage was in many cases their only 
means of support. But given improved opportunities for 
women, they need not be financially dependent on men. Even 
with the current inequalities, many women are in a position to 
refuse a marriage that offers unequal terms once they come to 
recognize them as such. The key, I think, is recognizing them 
as such. While the desire for children is an additional incentive 
to marry, it is much easier for a woman than for a man to 
become a single parent, and it is not always worse than being 
a married parent. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
None of these remarks should not be confused with those of 
the libertarian apologist, who says, in effect, "C'mon, girls, it's 
not so bad!" There are serious obstacles to gender equality in 
modem industrial societies, as Okin points out. And the prob-
lem is not merely a matter of equality, but also of avoiding 
harm and of vulnerability to harm. Perhaps we should be more 
optimistic than Okin that people can work out just outcomes 
for themselves. However, we should be less optimistic than 
Okin that our legislators can work out just outcomes for us. 
Recent political trends do not inspire confidence. 
If sexist attitudes are ingrained enough to make nongov-
ernmental solutions unworkable, it is hard to see why they 
would not make governmental solutions equally unworkable. 
As Okin points out, there is every reason to believe that those 
in charge of writing, interpreting, and applying laws will be 
products of the prevailing gender system. When we hand the 
government the power to set the terms of marriage and em-
ployment, we hand it to people who, by and large, have gotten 
where they are by not having to worry about "women's work." 
So although it is tempting to construe "the woman question" 
as a dilemma between liberty and equality, it is doubtful, in 
this instance at least, that sacrificing liberty will make us more 
equal. Those of us who worry about what has traditionally been 
women's work are in the best position to find ways of seeing 
that such work gets done without sacrificing other things we 
value. 
